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1 Introduction 
There are early papers recognising that North Korea nuclear situation poses a serious security risk in the 
North-East Asia region (Hughes, 1996). Former papers have also been examining the credibility of the threat 
posed by North Korea nuclear missile program. Harrison (2000) questioned the credibility of the threat. He 
pointed clearly that it’s hard to evaluate whether the North Korea would be able to launch a missile capable 
of carrying a nuclear payload and to be able to hit the United States mainland. 
The discussion has been around the key factor whether the threats of North Korea are credible or not. In 
recent papers the credibility of North Korean Nuclear threats has widely been rejected. (Kim & Roland, 2014). 
Or at least made clear that the nuclear tests do not have catastrophic impact on south east Asia region 
(Noland, 2006). It has been pointed out that the even the experts have risen a concern and the news are 
sometimes discussing the possibility of nuclear war, the markets do not record this threat. 
However, it needs to be remembered that even the early recognition of the threat posed by North Korea, 
the amount of papers examining the effect of these threats are still limited (Noland, 2006). And some of them 
do not use any econometric tools to further make justice to their conclusions. In some papers the 
shortcoming is that those use only market level studies This together with the fact that the tension between 
North Korea and United States have rose during the most recent years, makes the subject interesting to 
contribute. The rising tension between North Korea and the US is recognised by various reporters through 
worldwide news agencies like Prasad CNBC (August 2017), Lester NBC NEWS (September 2017) and former 
Defence Secretary of United States Panetta as Tillett reported. North Korea’s rising intensity of nuclear and 
missile tests are realizing the more active development of their missile program with aim to develop missile 
capable of carrying nuclear warhead. These facts make it more interesting to examine the possible effects of 
the events affecting US asset prices. I assume that if the North Korea’s capabilities are about to change the 
effects are becoming more visible in the markets. 
In the paper I use event study methodology to test whether the North Korea’s threats affect US asset prices 
through increased patriotism or political uncertainty. This is done through performing difference in 
differences analysis with daily stock returns. And using multiple missile launches, nuclear tests and threats 
through media to test whether these events have impact on US stocks in the sense of increased patriotism 
or local political uncertainty. I also perform analysis for the possible changes in volatility. This is done on the 
purposes of robustness check if the threats would be registered through increasing uncertainty in markets 
rather than negative daily returns. I have two kind of main treatment groups and corresponding comparison 
groups.  
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The first treatment group Headquarters looks the credibility of these threats by local approach. It has been 
built regarding expert’s opinion that North Korea will be able to hit the US West Coast first and then later the 
East Coast. This is since The US West coast is closer to the North Korea. Thus, if North Korea can build a long 
range ballistic nuclear missile the West coast would be first within the reach of such a missile. I choose my 
first treatment group based on the headquarter location of the firm to test whether the market reaction to 
the threats of North Korea is registered only through group of firms in the West coast. One interesting thing 
to mention here is that many analysts and experts usually take a view on: When the North Korea will be able 
to hit the US East coast as there are the most crowded and well-known cities like Los Angeles, New York and 
Washington D.C. 
The second treatment group of Patriotic names takes more severe view of the current situation examining 
whether the market reacts in the same way to these threats as they tend to during war time. The US investor’s 
patriotism tends to increase during war times which becomes registered through stocks carrying patriotic 
name including US(A) or America(n) (Benos & Jochec, 2013). The most recent hostile behaviour of North 
Korea might be closest US have become war in their own land in many decades. Not to mention the huge 
media exposure which these events have gain in the recent years. 
Based on my study the threats posed by North Korea are not registered as credible by the markets. There is 
no observed difference between firms in the West and East coast to support the claim about the threat being 
local. And the investors patriotism is not increased similarly as during the war time. This behaviour is against 
the expert’s opinion claiming that the North Korean Nuclear threat is real and it would now be realised in the 
West coast. But aligned with the former studies of these events. There can be registered a small effect with 
a limited time window regarding the view that the West coast is more affected by the missile threats of North 
Korea. Still after using few control variables the effect gain significance only at 10% level. This is aligned with 
the opinion that the North Koreas nuclear threat is not taken seriously through markets.  
The rest of the thesis proceeds as follows. In Section 2, is given a theoretical background and reasoning for 
my research question through former research of the political uncertainty affecting stock prices and volatility. 
There is also provided a reasoning about the patriotism affecting investors behaviour through security names 
and the threats of North Korea posing threat in South East Asia. Section 3 gives insight to the data and 
empirical methodology used. Section 4 presents the empirical results of the study. In the section 5 is 
performed various robustness checks to support the findings. Section 6 gives conclusion about the study and 
offers suggestions for further research to be contributed. References can be found from section 7 and 
Appendixes from section 8. 
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2 Theoretical background and Hypotheses 
2.1 Political uncertainty affecting stock prices and volatility 
Many papers during the recent decade have found that political uncertainty tend to affect asset prices and 
volatility. Pastor and Veronesi (2012, 2013) offered a model and empirical evidence towards the fact that 
political uncertainty affects to risk premia. They provided evidences that political uncertainty affects directly 
to the risk premia. Smales (2014) presented empirical evidence to support the claim of political uncertainty 
affecting in Australian markets during federal elections. He found evidences that higher uncertainty around 
the elections tends to lead higher market uncertainty. He did this through poling data and five Australian 
elections cycles. He found that the volatility for both equity and bond options increased in line with 
uncertainty around the election results. The political uncertainty has been examined in various context also 
in the U.S. and in the Asia regions. Goodell and Vähämaa (2013) examined the political uncertainty during 
the U.S. presidential elections through volatility. They suggested that there is a positive relationship between 
implied volatility and election probability of the winning presidential candidate.  
As noted many former papers register political uncertainty through expected events for example government 
elections. (Goodell & Vähämaa, 2013), (Smales, 2014), (Li & Born, 2006), (Jens, 2017). Liu et. Al. (2017) 
examined the political uncertainty and asset prices in a case of unexpected event. They registered that Bo 
scandal in China tended to cause political uncertainty. They record a significant drop in stock prices, 
increasing volatility of stocks and decreasing cashflows during the event. In this event study I also use events 
which are unexpected, as one can’t predict when North Korea is going to pose another threat against U.S. or 
conduct another missile test. 
There are also various event studies recording political uncertainty through unexpected events. Chan and 
Wei (1996) recorded the political uncertainty effect using Hang Seng index in Hong Kong. Their main finding 
was that positive political news tend to produce positive stock returns and negative news causes negative 
returns. Jackson (2008) record negative movement on asset prices during 9/11 unpredictable terrorist attack 
in the US stock market but also highlighted the U.S. markets ability to fast recover from such a crisis. Chen 
and Siems (2003) found also similar results suggesting that U.S. capital markets recover from military attacks 
faster than other capital markets. Chesney et. al. (2011) examined multiple terrorist attach through various 
countries and found two thirds of the selected terrorist events causing significant negative impact on at least 
one of the observed stock markets. Perotti and Oijen (2001) investigate number of emerging markets under 
the political shocks. Their findings highlighted remarkable changes in excess returns when political risk 
increased or decreased. This is more evidence toward the findings that political uncertainty affects asset 
prices and the effect is even bigger among weaker economies (Pástor & Veronesi, Political uncertainty and 
risk premia, 2013). 
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2.2 Patriotism affecting investors behaviour through security names 
Studies have shown that there are evidences in the financial markets that Investors patriotic feeling affects 
their investment decisions. Morse and Shive (2011) observed whether the patriotic feelings of investors do 
affect home bias. They registered that investors in more patriotic countries are more heavily investing in 
domestic equity. Further they concluded that patriotism is not only associated with home bias. It’s affecting 
to investment decisions by its own.  
Cooper et. al. (2001) found evidences towards that company which changed their name in the right time 
earned abnormal returns during five days around the announcement. They used the American listed 
companies during 1998 and 1999 and the companies which changed their name to include .net or .com. Their 
findings were a bit in a contradiction with the previous studies which have registered that name changes do 
not have significant effect on the performance of the company and the effects which can be seen as positive 
are often found driven by other factors (Bosch & Hirschey, 1989). 
Benos and Jochec (2013) cross tested whether stock names do matter in a case of increased patriotism. They 
found evidences towards the fact that the stocks with patriotic sounding stock names tend to perform better 
during times when people’s patriotic sentiments are tend to be high and market is unable to fix this mispricing. 
They used the periods which U.S. was in war as measurement for increasing patriotism. Still after controlling 
other factors by constructing control portfolio of stocks with similar industry, size and book to market ratio 
they are not able to reduce the possibility that industry effects drive the abnormal returns. But they didn’t 
find clear factors driving their results other than the name bias. They also provide evidence that the stock 
price reaction wouldn’t be immediate and would rather take as long as two years to cumulate.  
2.3 North Korean posing threat in South East Asia 
There are also few papers which take a closer look on the threats posed by North Korea. Kim and Roland 
(2014) did event study based on the data from 2000 to 2008 on the effects of North Korean threats to South 
Korean financial markets. They argued that South Korea would be first to capture the effect of rising military 
tension from North Korea, because it’s located on the border of North Korea. They didn’t find significant 
effect for the events which they argued to affect the tension between the North and South Korea. Thus, they 
concluded that the threats of North Korea are not realistic. They based their argument on that the markets 
often contain better information than the experts’ opinions or any news agencies. 
Noland (2006) did a scenario analysis on North Korean threats affecting South East Asian countries. He argued 
that the North Korean nuclear test would have negative but non-catastrophic economic impact on the region. 
Noland argued that South Korea and Japan would be influenced through capital flight and China would be 
affected mainly through political tension with United States, Japan and The EU. This is because the previous 
mentioned entities would probably have a strong reaction towards North Korea developing their nuclear 
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capabilities. Noland concluded that the importance to determine the provocative behaviour of North Korea 
would be crucial since the events would need cooperation to further avoid large capital spill overs. 
Dibooglu and Cevik (2016) paid more attention to South Korean and Japan financial markets. They 
investigated the link between North Korean Threat Index (NKTI) build by NK news, arguing that it would be 
proper measure for the threatening level of North Korea behaviour, because the government heavily controls 
the nations’ media. They stated that the opinion of news needs to reflect the governments public opinions. 
They found a causal link between the NKTI, stock returns and exchange rates but didn’t find it between NKTI 
and overnight interest rates. Their main conclusion was apart from previous studies. Being first to record 
significant effect to South Korean and Japan security market stability due to North Korea hostile behaviour. 
None of these previous studies have examined the North Korean hostile behaviour effects on US asset prices. 
In recent years the US and North Korea have been posting hard statements against one another in the media. 
North Korea have also recently performed missile test and test firings with increasing phase, making it totally 
16 this year. The previous record in amount of missile testlaunches was from 2016 when North Korea fired 
five missiles. As seen in the Figure 1 Google trend shows three major and two minor peaks from 1/2004 to 
12/2017 for word Nuclear War in the US. Four out of five of these peaks have been emerged after the Kim 
and Roland (2014) study window and thus would indicate that maybe the US have become more involved in 
the uncertainty during the most recent years which has already become reality in the Asia like Dibooglu and 
Cevik (2016) recorded.  The word North Korea has three clear peaks which all are after the 2008 end of the 
Kim and Roland (2014) study period giving also support to the claims that at least the threats of North Korea 
have started to gain more interest among American people due to the most recent events.  
8 
 
Figure 1 visualises the google trend for word nuclear war and North Korea in the United States from 1/2004 
to 10/2017. The numbers are illustrating the relative popularity of the search over the selected period. The 
value of the scale 100 is the area where the term was most 0 is the area where searches were less than 1% 
of the largest share. From the Figure can easily be pointed out the increasing intensity of searches for the 
following words under two most recent years compared to the prior. 
 
2.4 Setting up hypotheses 
Assuming United States stock market are efficient in the semi-strong form, all the time any piece of publicly 
available information should be reflected in the stock prices. (Chan;Gup;& Pan, 1997), (Arshanapalli & Doukas, 
1993) As noted before there are number of papers examining the effects of political uncertainty affecting 
asset prices and volatility. I set up to test to examine whether Korean threats increases political uncertainty 
in the United States which can be recorded through stock market. Stock market is a good metric as it’s not 
biased due to some individual expert’s opinions. It rather reflects the markets opinion regarding the reality 
of the threat. Same time align with the former studies I state that the capabilities of North Korea are under 
a big question mark. For this reason, I argue that the decrease in daily returns can be recorded through firms 
in the West coast rather than in the whole U.S.. For this reason, firms in the East Coast are not affected due 
to the reason that North Korea is not seen to be able to hit the East coast yet with a missile carrying nuclear 
warhead. My Hypothesis one is: 
H1(Political uncertainty): The effect of North Korean hostile events causes asset prices to fall among firms in 
the West coast. 
My second hypothesis is combining the patriotism and stock names. I argue that the patriotic feeling of 
Americans is increased during hostile events of North Korea. I study whether the increased feeling of 
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patriotism is captured by investing in securities which carry patriotic sounding name. This is similar kind of 
study which Benos and Jochec (2013) did regarding the war periods in U.S’ history. I want to apply the 
following idea and methodology here as the hostile activities and straight threats posed by North Korea might 
be the closest U.S have been war in their own land for decades. My second hypothesis aim to capture this 
increase in patriotism: 
H2(Patriotic): The North Korean hostile behaviour increases Americans patriotic feeling and it’s captured by 
investing more to firms carrying patriotic names on their stocks. 
 
3 Data and Methodology 
3.1 Initial Data 
My initial data consist of two main databases provided by Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS, 2017). I 
use the CRSP for the daily stock data including: company names, North American Industry Classification 
System-code (NAICS), number of shares outstanding, price and the daily stock returns. I use CRSP/Compustat 
merged database provided by WRDS for quarterly reported data. This database provides me data such as: 
Company total assets, Company total liabilities, calendar quarter for the data, headquarter location 
(Headquarters’ state) and Country code for the headquarter and it can be easily merged with the 
corresponding data with CRSP database. The daily data is matched with the most prior reported quarter data. 
For example, observation date 16.6.2017 the corresponding quarter is 1/2017 as it’s the most recent quarter 
data already available at the time. 
The CRSP U.S. Stock database consists information on primary listings for equity securities for the NYSE, NYSE 
MKT, NASDAQ, and Arca exchanges. I filter firms based on two factors. The first condition is that the firms 
share code is equal to 10 or 11. It means that it needs to be primary listed equity security. This is due to the 
reason I want to observe US firms and not include cross listed companies, ADRs or Reits as those might be 
more driven by another factors than the events. I also filter firms based on the condition that those need to 
represent non-financial firms. This is done by excluding all the firms which carry NAICS sector-code (two first 
digit of NAICS-code) 52. The following group equals Finance and Insurance companies in the NAICS-code 
system.  
I acknowledge that there might be excluded some insurance companies which are not financials but the 
exclusion is made due to the clarity of work as one cannot easily state whether these insurance firm’s 
business is not including major part of financial firm’s nature. To be noted here, there is only one subsector 
which would be considered to add in based on including these insurance companies which is 524 Insurance 
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carriers and related activities. After this said I argue it doesn’t change results drastically by adding this group 
of firms to the sample so for the clarity and consistency of the work the complete sector of 52 is excluded. 
Companies registered NAICS sector code 52 in the Compustat dataset are also excluded. In this way If the 
company is registered to sector 52 in either of the databases, it’s dropped from the initial data.  
3.2 List of events 
I set my study period from January 2006 to September 2017. The beginning of data is chosen by the fact that 
there was long period after Bush’s speech “Axis of Evil” (Wikipedia Axis of evil) after the North Korea 
conducted again missile test in July 2006. The end of data is chosen on the basis that it’s the most prior data 
currently available in the WRDS database. I use multiple sources to collect and confirm the dates and events 
to use in my study. The main sources used to collect the events were Wikipedia (Wikipedia North Korea 
Missile tests, 2017), CNBC (CNBC North Korea, 2017), BBC (BBC North Korea profile timeline, 2017) NY-times 
(NY times, 2017), CNN (CNN North Korea News, 2017) and US Department of State press releases (U.S. 
Department of State, 2017). I cross check reported events from various sources because it’s not enough if 
the event is only registered in one source. The events registered by U.S.’ media and authorities are included 
with the focus on the events which were felt to be hostile against United States. This limitation is done, 
because United States is not the only country which has been target of the threats and hostile words of North 
Korea. Every single news date which were related to news of North Korea are not included. Instead aimed to 
focus on days which were peaks in the Google trend seen in Figure 1. This makes sense as these events might 
cause more effect on the market because those captured audience attentions. This results in 37 events during 
35 individual event dates. The original event dates, date used as event date, very brief description of the 
event and event type by my classification can be seen in Appendix A.  
Kim and Ronland (2014) picked their event data from South Korean authority’s official documents. I don’t 
use those simply due to the reason I don’t have easy access to that kind of data. I include three types of 
events in my sample: Test firing of missiles (24 events), Nuclear tests (4 events) and the most hostile word 
changing through public media (8 events) between North Korean president and the president of the United 
States. The tweets by U.S.’ president or the North Korean president are not included. This is done due to the 
reason that it feels that the presidents can tweet almost anything without words to action.  
The used event period is five days before the event and five days after the event. I include the event day to 
the five days after the period. In this way there is no “day zero” in the event windows and the event day is 
the day number 1 if you think the whole event window as [-5 +5]. In the robustness check section is also 
provided a test for event windows [-3 +3], [-10 +10] and [-20 +20] days. Naturally only the days which 
exchanges were open in U.S. are included, excluding weekends and holidays. In the cases where the event 
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was recorded during national holiday or weekend, the next closest banking day is used as the final event date, 
because that’s the time when the events possible effect can be recorded in the markets.  
In the cases where two or more event periods are overlapping with one to another the following process is 
applied: The days before and after the first event are choose normally and if there are days before the next 
event I take those days as prior event days. If the event is in another events post period (= [1 5]) the count of 
the post event days starts over from there. This results in a situation that the end of observations for the 
event window is always the observed number of post event days from the last event in the overlapping group 
of events. At the same time all the no effect days between the event dates become correctly chosen.  
Later chapters explain the method of choosing the control groups and treatment groups. In this context 
concept matching day is used. Matching day is the most prior day before the entire event window. With a 
five-day event period ([-5 5]) it is the sixth day before the event (day number -6). And in case of many events 
during the same event window the group of stocks are matched prior to the first event. I do recognise that 
in cases there are multiple events overlapping the event window becomes longer and thus the matching day 
gets further in the future. I argue that in a case of using 10 business days this is not such big problem as the 
longest period between the event and the matching day is about a month. And as multiple matching firms 
are used the possible outliers effect (firms performing exceptionally well during this month and becomes to 
differ) becomes diluted and thus not driving the results. 
3.3 Empirical methodology: Difference in differences analysis through OLS-regression 
The difference in differences (DiD) approach’s basic idea is that there are two groups: treatment group and 
control group. And the aim is to study the different reaction of these groups against the “treatment”. The 
goal is to observe similar kind of behaviour among these groups prior to the event and different kind of 
behaviour in the post window of the event. The different behaviour among the groups then becomes visible 
by comparing the differences prior to the event and after the recorded event. I apply DiD-analysis in OLS 
regression to observe the effect of the North Korean events in United States through differences in daily 
stock returns between the treatment and comparison groups.  
In the regression is included returns as observable variable and three explanatory variables together with 
three control variables. The explanatory variables are Treatment (whether the stock is in my treatment 
group), Post (whether the day is in the predicted effect window) and Treatment*Post (whether the 
observation is predicted to be affected). The control variables include two fixed effects estimates and natural 
logarithm of one day lagged firm size as independent control variable. I run Ordinary Least Square (OLS) 
regression using the described variables. The general main point of interest is the treat*post variables 
coefficient and of course its standard error as well as the t-statistic and p-values. This is since it’s the variable 
which captures the combined effect of the stock being under treatment (belonging to treatment group under 
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used post event period). In other words it captures the observed difference in differences between the 
treatment and control group. To add robustness and for the reasons described in the following two chapter 
I also include firm fixed effect and date fixed effect. The final model for the regression becomes: 
𝑦 ~ 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑥1 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑥2 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝑥3 + 𝛽4 ∗ 𝑥4 + 𝛽𝑛 ∗ 𝐹𝑛 + 𝛽𝑟 ∗ 𝐷𝑟 + 𝜀 
Where  Fn = Estimated firm fixed effects 
Dr = Estimated daily fixed effects 
X4 = natural logarithm of the firm size lagged by one day 
𝛽n 𝛽r 𝛽4 = corresponding coefficients estimates 
Here fixed effects estimates have clustered standard errors which allow for intragroup correlation. This is the 
robust way as we want to allow variation on observations among firms and dates naturally when observing the 
daily returns of the firms.  
I use the option to allow intragroup correlation inside my firm fixed and day fixed effects, so that my standard 
errors would thus become more correctly calculated and results more robust.  In other words, the 
observation between different groups (days or firms) are independent but not necessarily inside the groups.  
Difference in Difference analysis became known in the economic world since Card and Krueger (1995) 
performed study on the effect of minimum wage in New Jersey using the DiD-method. After this the method 
become increasingly popular (Bertrand et. al. 2004). Slaughter (2001) used DID analysis to contribute 
robustness checks to the previous studies about liberalization and per capita income convergence resulting 
in a contradiction with the former studies suggesting that huge part of previous studies lack of robustness.  
In the following two chapters I explain my method of choosing treatment and comparison group for each of 
the Hypotheses. 
3.4 Choosing treatment and comparison group for Hypothesis 1 
For the Headquarter hypothesis (H1) companies which register their headquarters’ country something else 
than US are excluded. This is done due to the natural reason that those headquarters can’t locate on either 
East or West coast of United states. The treatment group is selected from my initial data by the requirement 
that the firm’s reported headquarter should be located on the West coast on the matching day. My initial 
treatment group is all listed firms with the headquarter in the West coast. Appendix B reports the states 
classified as West Coast.  
The control group is built with aim to choose five comparable firms against every firm in my treatment group 
on the matching day. The firms should be as similar as possible except the headquarter location (observed 
difference). In this way the aim is to minimize the other effects for example industry specific effects or size 
effects. The other location and date specific effects like hurricanes on another coast should become diluted 
by the multiple events used in the study. It would be highly unlikely that there would be coast specific effects 
during most of my event windows to drive the results. 
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Four conditions are used 1) size, 2) book to market, 3) NAICS-sector code and 4) Location of the Headquarter 
to define the group where the control group is finally picked with the 5) distance variable. Next is a brief 
description of each of the variables defined: 
1) Firm’s size is simply calculated as the Shares outstanding times absolute value of price observation on 
matching day. As sometimes the price observation is negative due to the reason that If the closing price is 
not available on a given trading day, the number in the price field has a negative sign to indicate that it is a 
bid/ask average and not an actual closing price. 
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 = 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 ∗ 𝐴𝐵𝑆(𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒)  
2) Book to market is calculated simply by 
𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑡𝑜 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 =
𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒
 ,   where 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 = 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 − 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 
Assets and Liabilities total are collected from the quarterly reported data and merged with corresponding 
daily data as previously described in the “3.1 Initial data”-chapter. 
3) The NAICS-sector code is the two first digit of the NAICS code. Simply if the code is  111339 the sector code 
is 11 equal to Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing and Hunting.  
4) Headquarter location for the firm in the comparison group needs to be in the East coast. The states 
recognised belonging to East coast are listed in Appendix B. 
After calculating these variables, the firms in the control group needs to have same NAICS sector code, +/- 
40% book value(BV) and +/- 40% size to be matching candidate for the corresponding firm in the treatment 
group. The purpose is to ensure that both groups of stocks are as similar as possible despite the observed 
difference, in this case the Headquarter location effect.  
Then the following formula is applied to calculate the distance variable: 
5) the distance variable for each of the matching candidates: 
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 = (
𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 − 𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒
𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒
)
2
+ (
𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠 𝐵𝑉 − 𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝐵𝑉
𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠 𝐵𝑉
)
2
 
 
After calculating the distance variable, next step is to define the rank variable inside every group of possible 
matching candidates with increasing values (the stock with the smallest distance inside its group gains rank 
1 etc.). Then all the firms which have rank five or under are chosen to control group. The treated firms with 
no matches found are dropped from the sample. Finally all the treated group firms which have later changed 
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their Headquarter location between West and East coast and thus become selected in both of the groups in 
different times are excluded from the control group. In the Table 1 is the brief descriptive statistic of 
treatment and comparison group pointing describing their similarity and key statistics. 
Table 1 describes the key statistics of the chosen Control and Treatment group on the matching days. The 
size and book to market (BM) is calculated as simple averages from the observations on the matching days. 
Number of firms is the number of unique firms in the sample. Average distance is calculated  on matching 
day is among the chosen control firms. 
 Headquarters 5 days 
variable Treatment Control 
size 3941430 2278608 
BM 0.0005232752 0.0004925864 
number of unique firms 1165 1846 
Average distance 0.075121  
 
The number of unique firms are quite close to each other’s even with the aim to select five control firm 
against every treated firm. This is since the firms in the East coast are only accepted, so the number of 
possible matching firms becomes limited.   I do note that the average size of the treatment group is well of 
the size of the control group. This is since there is found greater number of matches for the small firms in 
general. This then drives the average size of my control group down. For this reason, I include several control 
variables like logarithmic lagged size and firm fixed effect in my regression to avoid the bias possible caused 
by the size of the firms. 
3.5 Choosing treatment and comparison group for Hypothesis 2 
For the patriotic names Hypothesis, Assumption is made that when the aim is to capture the increasing 
patriotism trough stock names, it doesn’t matter whether the firms headquarter is in the U.S or not. This is 
because investors with irrationality of investing shares based on their names might not be so worried about 
which country the headquarter is located. This is also shown in the robustness check for patriotic names 
hypothesis by performing the analysis and including only firms with headquarters in the United States. 
The treatment group for the Hypothesis 2 is picked with similar kind of method as Benos and Jochec (2013). 
The company’s name is classified patriotic if it contains the word “America(n)” or “US(A)” on the event date. 
Also “U(.)S(.)” combinations are accepted because I found with manual checking that in many cases if not all 
it refers to United States in the stock name. I don’t take further opinion whether the name is patriotic or not. 
In the paper they excluded few firms based on that the word America did refer to some specific area inside 
the United States or word US referred to “us”. The following firms are accepted as well stating that irrational 
investor might not care in which is the final referring purpose of America or US in the stock’s name. This kind 
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of cases becomes extremely rare and in this way effect of those companies becomes diluted. After picking 
the treatment group similar kind of methods are used as in Hypothesis 1 to pick the control group with one 
exception. The headquarter condition (number 4) is not used.  Size, book value, book to market and distance 
variables calculated and similar limitation used as with Hypothesis 1 to form group of candidates for the 
control group. The distance variable is calculated and the stocks which received rank equal or under five are 
picked to the final control group. 
After picking up all the stocks based on their rank the firms with no matches are excluded. If firm arises in 
both groups during the whole event period, it’s deleted from the control group. The key statistic of firms in 
the treatment group and control group on the matching day are summarized in the Table 2. 
Table 2 describes the key statistics of the chosen Control and Treatment group on the matching days. The 
size and book to market (BM) is calculated as simple averages from the observations on the matching days. 
Number of firms is the number of unique firms in the sample. Number of observations is the number of 
observations on the matching days. 
 Patriotic 5 days 
variable Treatment Control 
size 2677326 2114009 
BM 0.006570907 0.0005963055 
number of unique firms 118 1313 
Average distance 0.04213796  
   
The average size of the treatment group is well of the size of the control group. This is since there is found 
greater number of matches for the small firms in general. This then drives the average size of my control 
group down. For this reason, several control variables are included like logarithmic lagged size and firm fixed 
effect in my regression to avoid the bias possible caused by the size of the firms. Now there are plenty of 
more unique control firms than treatment firms. This is good since the matching is done multiple times there 
emerges big rotation on the control firms side. This means that possible one firms effects trough the sample 
becomes smaller. 
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4 Main findings 
The next step is to regress model specified in the “3.Data and Methodology”-section. To refresh the memory, 
the model which coefficients becomes estimated is: 
 𝑦 ~ 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑥1 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑥2 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝑥3 + 𝛽4 ∗ 𝑥4 + 𝛽𝑛 ∗ 𝐹𝑛 + 𝛽𝑟 ∗ 𝐷𝑟 + 𝜀 
Where  y = daily return factor 
 x1 = treat dummy    
 x2 = post dummy   
x3 = treat*post dummy  
X4 = natural logarithm of the firm size lagged by one day   
Fn = Firm fixed effects specified with treatment 
Dr = Day fixed effects 
β1 to β4 and 𝛽n 𝛽r   = corresponding coefficients estimates 
ε = error term 
 
 
The estimated coefficients and corresponding standard errors together with T-statistics for Hypothesis 1 can 
be seen in table 3. One could wonder why the coefficient and corresponding statistics for the post variable 
are not reported. The explanation is simple: the daily fixed effect is used the post variable becomes omitted. 
This is through the fact that naturally when including every day’s individual dummy variable in the regression 
it captures all the movement of the post variable (which is dummy variable for the days after the event 
gaining value 1 and otherwise being 0) and thus becomes omitted. The treat variable becomes omitted as 
well for the similar reasons when adding the firm fixed effect to the regression. For this reason, the post or 
the treat variable statistics are not reported. There is no difference between results by running the regression 
without or with the post and the treat variable. The results naturally stay the same in either of the cases as 
the variables truly are omitted.  
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Table 3 describes the estimated coefficients (Coef.), standard errors(Std.er.) and corresponding T-statistics(t) 
together with p-values(p) for the Hypothesis 1 Headquarters. In the table Treatpost(TP) is the dummy 
variable indicating to the observed treatment affection. Logsize is the control variable which is natural 
logarithm from one day lagged firm size. Treat and post dummies are omitted due to collinearity with fixed 
effects and thus excluded from the table. In the tables lower section is reported usage of Firm and date fixed 
effects, Models R-square and adjusted R-square together with number of observations. Signs * (10%), ** (5%) 
and *** (1%) refers to the most common statistical significance levels 
 Coef. Std. Err. T  p>T 
treatpost(TP) -0.0001309 0.0002869 -0.46 0.648 
logsize -0.0025279 0.0003272 -7.72*** 0.000*** 
Firmfixed effect yes    
Date fixed effect yes    
R-squared 0.0851    
Adj R-squared 0.0801    
Number of observations 612 039    
From the results in table 3 can clearly be noted that there is no significant observed through the treatpost(TP) 
variable. TP variable is the main interest here as described earlier. It combines the dummies of belonging in 
to the treatment group and being under the effects time window just after North Koreas posed hostile 
behaviour. It can be clearly pointed out that the T*E variable is gaining quite small coefficient of -.0001238 
and even though it’s in the right direction (minus sigh) to give support to my Hypothesis 1 it’s gaining p-value 
of 0.66 which is even far from significant even at 20% or even 40% level. Thus, the results clearly pointing the 
direction to reject the Hypothesis 1. There is still a bit space before jumping to the most final conclusions and 
performing various other analysis in the following robustness check section. In the section there are 
performed various other analysis for example with different time periods and alternative volatility analysis 
to make the results more robust and to be sure that there is no difference between East and West coast 
under hostile behaviour of North Korea. 
The same regression model for Hypothesis 2 Patriotic is used but with different group of stocks. In the table 
4 is reported the key statistics for the Hypothesis 2 which aims to discover whether there is increase in the 
patriotism under the periods of North Koreas hostile behaviour. 
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Table 4 describes the estimated coefficients (Coef.), standard errors(Std.er.) and corresponding T-statistics(t) 
together with p-values(p) for the Hypothesis 2 Patriotic. In the table Treatpost(TP) is the dummy variable 
indicating the observed treatment affection.Treat and post dummies are omitted due to collinearity with 
fixed effects and thus excluded from the table.  Logsize is the control variable which is natural logarithm from 
one day lagged firm size. In the tables lower section is reported usage of Firm and date fixed effects, Models 
R-square and adjusted R-square together with number of observations. Signs * (10%), ** (5%) and *** (1%) 
refers to the most common statistical significance levels 
  Coef. Std. Err. T p>T 
treatpost(TP) -0.00004 0.000499 -0.08 0.938 
logsize -0.00498 0.000789 -6.32*** 0.000*** 
Firmfixed effect yes    
Date fixed effect yes    
R-squared 0.1008    
Adj R-squared 0.0709    
Number of observations 52 693    
 
The treatpost variable is far from implied by the Hypothesis two. It’s not significant at any level, small even 
relatively speaking and after all this in to the wrong direction to support Hypothesis 2. Once again, the R-
square and adjusted R-square are quite small but it’s not the most concerning thing when it comes to results 
to support the Hypothesis 2. By these results it implies in to the direction to reject also Hypothesis 2. Even 
the most optimistic sight would reject this hypothesis from further investigation in the following section is 
still performed various robustness checks to add robustness. The next section contains various robustness 
checks for both Hypotheses 1 and 2.  
5 Robustness check 
5.1 Different event windows 
What if the effect of these threats is realised through longer period or it’s only lasting few days? To show 
that the results are robust under these assumptions I provide my results also with additional event windows. 
In this section the regression also performed with [-3 +3], [-10 +10] and [-20 +20] event windows. The 
treatment group stays the same for each of the Hypothesis 1 and 2. The corresponding control group is found 
similarly in each of the cases as with the five-day time window. The matching and picking the control group 
is done always on the most prior day before the event window. For example, if the event window is [-3 +3] 
the matching in this case is done on day -4 etc. I do recognise that when the observed event window becomes 
longer the matching tends to get rarer and the observed prior event days becomes less in numbers. Though 
the dates are not included twice to avoid overstatement or understatement of the effect. The process goes 
19 
 
as described in the method section including each day only once in the final sample. The results of OLS-
regression for different time periods for Hypothesis 1 and 2 in table 5 and 6. 
Table 5 reports the estimated coefficients (Coef.), standard errors(Std.er.) and corresponding T-statistics(t) 
together with p-values(p) for the Hypothesis 1 with additional event windows noted in the headers. In the 
table Treatpost(TP) is the dummy variable indicating the observed treatment affection. Logsize is the control 
variable which is natural logarithm from one day lagged firm size. Treat and post dummies are omitted due 
to collinearity with fixed effects and thus excluded from the table. In the tables lower section is reported 
usage of Firm and date fixed effects, Models R-square and adjusted R-square together with number of 
observations. Signs * (10%), ** (5%) and *** (1%) refers to the most common statistical significance levels 
 West vs. East coast +/-3 days West vs. East coast +/-10 days West vs. East coast +/-20 days 
  Coef. Std. Err. T (p>T) Coef. Std. Err. T (p>T) Coef. Std. Err. T (p>T) 
             
treateffect -0.00065 0.0004 -1.80 
(0.073*) 
-0.00016 0.00024 -0.67 
(0.504) 
-0.00014 0.00021 -0.68 
(0.496) 
logs -0.00290 0.00037 -7.77 
(0.00***) 
-0.00239 0.00024 -9.69 
(0.00***) 
-0.00250 0.00021 -11.86 
(0.00***) 
Firm fixed 
effect 
yes   yes   yes   
Date fixed 
effect 
yes   yes   yes   
R-squared 0.0915    0.0801   175,678   
Adj R-squared 0.0845 
 
  0.0769 
  
0.0815 
  
Number of obs 411 698 
 
  961 137 
  
1 494 433 
  
 
The results support earlier conclusions that there are no significant effect among firms in the West coast 
compared to the east coast when North Korea conducts nuclear test or test launches their missiles. One 
coefficient Headquarter +/- 3 days event window gains very small coefficient -0.00065 and is significant at 
10% level. The effect was without control variables significant even at 5% level, but logsize and fixed effects 
captured the effect even to be significant only at 10% level. This raises attention about the fact whether there 
is effect, but it fades away quickly. For this reason, I tried the regression with one more additional event 
window of +/-2 days. The effects significance of the coefficient disappeared for that reason not reported in 
the thesis.  The final decision is to reject Hypothesis 1 and thus claim that there is no effect among firms in 
the West during the hostile behaviour of North Korea. 
The table 6 continues the story. There are no significant coefficients recorded for the observed treatpost 
coefficient even at 10% level. Still one interesting thing here is that the hypothesis with the widest event 
window gains the most significant coefficient of treatpost but still with the wrong sign. And when increasing 
20 
 
the event window it becomes almost significant at 10% level. I also investigated whether adding the condition 
that the headquarter of the stock classified as patriotic needs to be in the United States. The results of the 
regression are reported in the Appendix C. Generally, those don’t report anything deviant when comparing 
to the results below. Coefficients are small and more insignificant than the ones below supporting my 
statement of the fact that irrational investors might not care about headquarter location of the patriotic 
sounding firm. 
 After these conclusions I decide to reject my Hypothesis 2 also and thus conclude that there is no significant 
reaction towards increase in patriotism in the United States after North Koreas hostile behaviour or at least 
it’s not recorded through investing in patriotic stocks inside short period. 
Benos and Jochec (2013) found in their study that patriotic stocks tend to react slowly, and it’s realized when 
observing with long period of cumulation. In this case I leave that for later studies. It would be interesting 
investigate whether the trend of increasing the event window makes the treatpost coefficient significant 
even at 5% level. Next is the very final robustness check section before rejecting my hypotheses finally. In 
the following sub-section, I perform rolling volatility analysis for both of my Hypotheses. The method 
described in the very most beginning of the chapter and results in the end of the chapter. 
Table 6 reports the estimated coefficients (Coef.), standard errors(Std.er.) and corresponding T-statistics(t) 
together with p-values(p) for Hypothesis 1 with additional event windows noted in the headers. In the table 
Treatpost(TP) is the dummy variable indicating the observed treatment affection. Logsize is the control 
variable which is natural logarithm from one day lagged firm size. Treat and post dummies are omitted due 
to collinearity with fixed effects and thus excluded from the table. In the tables lower section is reported 
usage of Firm and date fixed effects, Models R-square and adjusted R-square together with number of 
observations. Signs * (10%), ** (5%) and *** (1%) refers to the most common statistical significance levels 
 Patriotic +/-3 days Patriotic +/-10 days Patriotic +/-20 days 
  Coef. Std. Err. T (p>T) Coef. Std. Err. T (p>T) Coef. Std. Err. T (p>T) 
             
Treatpost 
 
-0.00038 0.00060 -0.06 
(0.949) 
-0.00051 0.00039 -1.3 
(0.193) 
-0.00058 0.000374 -1.56 
(0.119) 
logsize -0.00492 0.00093 -5.32 
(0.000***) 
-0.05147 0.00058 -8.77 
(0.00***) 
-0.00586 0.00083 -6.83 
(0.00***) 
Firm fixed 
effect 
yes   yes   yes   
Date fixed 
effect 
yes   yes   yes   
R-squared 0.1099    0.0980   0.0864   
Adj R-squared 0.0697 
 
  0.0807 
  
0.0748 
  
Number of obs 46 297 
 
  112 448 
  
175 467 
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5.2 Volatility analysis 
There is still a slight possibility that the effects of hostile events are recorded trough the up and down 
movement in the daily stock returns rather than universal decreasing trend. In this case the effects of political 
uncertainty would become recorded as increase in the volatility of daily returns. Many former papers have 
examined the increased volatility in the concept of political uncertainty. (Pastor and Veronesi 2012, 2013), 
(Smales, 2014) and (Goodell & Vähämaa, 2013). For this reason, I have built alternative Hypotheses to 
observe the possible changes in volatility after the events. My alternative hypothesis is for the Hypothesis 1: 
H1b: The volatility is increased among firms in the West coast due to increased political uncertainty posed by 
North Korean hostile events.  
The volatility analysis is performed also for the Hypothesis 2. The aim is to examine whether the effect of 
hostile behaviour is observed more strongly among the group of patriotic stocks than the control group. The 
volatility might be better measure than the daily stock returns, because it captures the possible “elevator 
movement” in the daily returns. The following alternative Hypothesis is set to examine the effect of volatility 
among the patriotic stocks: 
 H2b: The volatility increases among patriotic stocks because those are more affected by North Korean hostile 
events. 
Volatility is observed through differences between my treatment and control group by using the difference 
in differences analysis. The method is very similar as in the case of observing daily stock returns. I count the 
daily volatility observation as 10 day lagged rolling volatility. The volatility in day T is the standard deviation 
of the daily return observations from T-9 to T. The treatment group and control group are the same as in the 
case of observing [-20 +20] daily returns and the volatility analysis is performed by using only this event 
window. I wanted to use only the [-20 20] event window, because when observing the volatility by rolling 
volatility it tends to change slowly. The method allows to observe 11 days before the event (prior event 
period) and 20 days after the event (post period) volatility observations. This is since the first observation of 
the event widow is day 10 observation. After calculating the volatility observations, the OLS-regression is run 
with the same model as before. The exception is that the volatility observations replace the daily return 
observations. Naturally the event window is dropped from 40 days to 31 days because the method of 
calculating volatility as mentioned earlier. The results of the regression for both Hypotheses 1 and 2can be 
seen in table 7. 
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Table 7 reports the estimated coefficients (Coef.), standard errors(Std.er.) and corresponding T-statistics(t) 
together with p-values(p) for Hypothesis 1 and 2 volatility analysis. Here treatpost(TP) is the dummy variable 
indicating observed treatment affection. Logsize is the control variable which is natural logarithm from one 
day lagged firm size. Treat and post dummies are omitted due to collinearity with fixed effects and thus 
excluded from the table. Also, models R-square and adjusted R-square are reported together with Number 
of observations. Signs * (10%), ** (5%) and *** (1%) refers to the most common statistical significance levels 
 West vs. East coast volatility (31days) Patriotic volatility (31 days) 
  Coef. Std. Err. T (p>T) Coef. Std. Err. T (p>T) 
         
treateffect 0.00046 0.00044 1.06 
(0.291) 
-0.00059 0.00056 -1.06 
(0.291) 
logs -0.00405 0.00039 -10.35 
(0.000***) 
-0.00590 0.00116 -5.06 
(0.000***) 
Firm fixed 
effect 
yes   yes   
Date fixed 
effect 
yes   yes   
R-squared 0.2674    0.4040   
Adj R-
squared 
0.2654 
 
  0.3954 
  
Number 
of obs 
1,280,913 
 
  149 254 
  
Even though the coefficient is in the right direction with the West vs. East scenario it doesn’t gain enough 
significance to be credible. It’s not significant even at 25% significance level. In the patriotic firms case the 
volatility coefficient is in the wrong direction implying decrease in daily volatility after the event compared 
to the control group. After these regressions I decide to reject my alternative Hypotheses 1b and 2b. This 
leaves me to conclude that there is no effect in the names of increase in volatility.  
I recognise that it would be more ideal to record the daily volatility as inter daily volatility observations. It 
would be beneficial, because it would reflect the true behaviour of the stocks on the daily level. By this 
modification the matching day would become closer of the event day as well. I have not used the inter daily 
volatility observations because I don’t have easy access in such a data and thus it would take excessive 
amount of time to get hands on such a data. Because of these factors I decided to leave it to the later studies. 
6 Conclusions and discussion 
The study contributes to observe the possible effect of North Korea hostile behaviour to the United States 
asset prices. This is done through two different kind of Hypotheses. The first aimed to capture the different 
behaviour of stocks between West and East coast claiming that the capabilities of North Korea to launch 
intercontinental missile makes the threat local. The other aimed to capture effect on asset prices through 
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increased patriotic feeling realised through investing more to patriotic stocks. Using similar kind of methods 
as some former research (Benos & Jochec, 2013). 
 Even with the increase phase of nuclear and missile test in the North Korea together with worldwide media 
coverage of the events there is no effect recorded on United States asset prices with the following 
classification used. After running multiple difference in differences regression with three control variables 
and clustered standard errors I end up rejecting both of my main Hypotheses. This leaves the results together 
with former studies stating that even if experts tend to highlight the threat posed by North Korea, the market 
at least in the United States is not yet taking that threat seriously (Kim & Roland, 2014) (Noland, 2006).  
After performing various robustness checks there is still many opportunities for further investigation of these 
events. To perform better, I would suggest observing daily volatility instead of rolling volatility to capture the 
most hectic changes inside the corresponding days. Also using another classification for the treated group 
for example investigate whether the State ownership plays a role like former papers have investigated in a 
different context (Zhou, 2017) (Liu et.al (2017). The topic stays timely if North Korea and United States 
relationship stays cold.  
In the broader scale now when the research around political uncertainties have been increasingly intense, it 
would be interesting to see some studies with very robust method focussing on the hostile behaviour of 
North Korea and those possible effect on Asia. Also update on this intense situation between United States 
and North Korea would be worthwhile observing through different markets even though I didn’t now record 
the effects significant through stock markets. 
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8 Appendixes 
Appendix A 
Appendix A table Includes a list of hostile events by North Korea between 2006- September 2017. Table 
records the original calendar date of the event as well as the business day used as event day in the study. If 
the Original date is highlighted with different colour it means that there were google trend peak in the 
following day for word “Nuclear war” or “North Korea” in the United States. In the table is also included 
classification and brief description of the events which helps further to give clear picture of the event types 
used in the study.  
Original 
date 
Date used 
Type 
(Media/Missile 
test/Nuclear 
test) 
Brief Description 
29.1.2002 NOT USED Media 
George W. Bush named North Korea as part of axis of evil and 
noted while the people are starving the country is developing 
arms of mass destruction 
17.10.2002 NOT USED Media 
Us announces new intelligence information that North Korea had 
over the past years keep developing its nuclear program despite 
its compact to disarm those 
5.7.2006 5.7.2006 Missile test 
North Korea launched long range Taepodong 2 missile and short-
range Scud North Korea made the firing public on July 6th 
9.10.2006 9.10.2006 Missile test 
North Korea conducted its first nuclear test which was announced 
3.10.2006. 
4.7.2009 6.7.2009 Missile test 
North Korea launched seven short range missiles into the Sea of 
Japan. This was violation against United Nations Security Council 
Resolution 1874 
25.9.2009 25.9.2009 Nuclear tests North Korea conducted its second nuclear device detonation 
12.2.2013 12.2.2013 Nuclear tests North Korea media announced that North Korea have done its 
third nuclear test 
4.4.2013 4.4.2013 Media 
There was press release through US government site that North 
Korea launched another intermediate range ballistic missile 
9.4.2013 9.4.2013 Media 
North Korean media told foreign people to get safe in the border 
of North and South Korea in a case of conflict 
11.4.2013 11.4.2013 Media 
The news spread that American intelligence have confirmed that 
North Korea has learned how to fit nuclear warhead in a ballistic 
missile 
18.5, 19.5, 
20.5.2013 
20.5.2013 Missile test 
North Korea fired four short range missiles during the three days 
and launched short range projectiles. 
30.6.2014 30.6.2014 Missile test 
North Korea test fired Nodong missile and South Korean ministry 
representatives protested as there were not designated "no-sail-
zone" 
6.1.2016 6.1.2016 Nuclear tests 
North Korea made its fourth nuclear test which was also noted in 
the US state government press release on the same day. 
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24.8.2016 24.8.2016 Missile test 
North Korea claimed that it had launched Pukkusong-1 missile 
which would be able to hit the United States 
5.9.2016 6.9.2016 
Missile test / 
Media 
It was stated that "The United States strongly condemns North 
Korea’s launch of three ballistic missiles into the Sea of Japan" in 
the State government press release just after North Korea fires off 
three modified Scud missiles. 
9.9.2016 9.9.2016 Nuclear tests North Korea claimed that it had detonated nuclear war head. This 
was noted also in the United States government press release 
15.10.2016 17.10.2016 Missile test North Korea tested ballistic missile 
19.10.2016 19.10.2016 Missile test North Korea test launched a medium range missile 
11.2.2017 13.2.2017 Missile test 
North Korea test fired Pukguksong 2 missile in to the Sea of Japan 
6.3.2017 6.3.2017 Missile test North Korea test launched four ballistic missiles, and some of 
them flew even 1000km 
4.4.2017 4.4.2017 Missile test 
North Korea test fired a medium range ballistic missile which was 
also noted in United States government press release said “we 
have spoken enough no further comments” 
15.4.2017 17.4.2017 Missile test North Korea tested a land base missile which was unrecognised 
28.4.2017 28.4.2017 Missile test North Korea test launched missile which was believed to be a 
medium range missile 
13.5.2017 15.5.2017 Missile test North Korea test fired Hwasong-12 missile which travelled 30 min 
and 789km. 
21.5.2017 22.5.2017 Missile test 
North Korea test fired another Pukguksong 2 missile in to the Sea 
of Japan which travelled approximately 450km 
29.5.2017 30.5.2017 Missile test North Korea test fired short range ballistic missile which travelled 
450km 
8.6.2017 8.6.2017 Missile test North Korea test fired several missiles into the Sea of Japan 
23.6.2017 23.6.2017 Missile test 
North Korea tested a new rocket engine that was believed to be 
closely linked in building intercontinental ballistic missile 
4.7.2017 5.7.2017 Missile test 
North Korea test fired its first Intercontinental ballistic missile 
(ICBM) which reached 2500km into space and landed 930km from 
its launch site.  
25.7.2017 25.7.2017 Media 
North Korea threated a nuclear strike on the United States if it 
attempts to remove Kim as leader according to Korean Central 
News Agency 
28.7.2017 28.7.2017 Missile test 
Just after the threat North Korea test launched another ICBM 
8.8.2017 8.8.2017 Media 
US president Donald Trump held well known speech against North 
Korea titled as "Fire and Fury" 
9.8.2017 9.8.2017 Media 
North Korean News agency said that North Korea is examining the 
operational plan to strike areas around US territory of Guam 
26.8.2017 28.8.2017 Missile test North Korea test fired three short range ballistic missiles 
29.8.2017 29.8.2017 Missile test North Korea launched a ballistic missile over Northern Japan 
3.9.2017 5.9.2017 Missile test 
North Korea conducted its sixth nuclear test which was recorded 
through earthquake seismologists. 
15.9.2017 15.9.2017 Missile test 
North Korea launched a ballistic missile which travelled 770km in 
height and flew 3700km over Hokkaido. 
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Appendix B 
Appendix B includes tables of states which are classified belonging to West and East coast 
  
States classified as West coast and their corresponding two letter state codes 
State code State official name 
CA State of California(CA),  
AK Washington 
HI State of Hawaii 
OR Oregon 
WA Alaska 
 
States classified as East coast and their corresponding two letter state codes 
State 
code 
State official 
name 
State 
code 
State official 
name 
NJ New Jersey NH New Hampshire 
CT Connecticut NY New York 
DC Washington D.C PA Pennsylvania 
DE Delaware PR Puerto Rico 
FL Florida RI Rhode Island 
GA Georgia SC South Carolina 
MA Massachusetts VA Virginia 
MD Maryland VI Virgin Islands 
ME Maine VT Vermont 
NC North Carolina   
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Appendix C 
Appendix C table reports the estimated coefficients (Coef.), standard errors(Std.er.) and corresponding T-statistics(t) together with p-values(p) for Hypothesis 
2 in a case of only including firms with headquarters in the United States. In the table Treatpost(TP) is the dummy variable indicating the observed treatment 
affection. Logsize is the control variable which is natural logarithm from one day lagged firm size. Treat and post dummies are omitted due to collinearity with 
fixed effects and thus excluded from the table. In the tables lower section is reported usage of Firm and date fixed effects, Models R-square and adjusted R-
square together with number of observations. Signs * (10%), ** (5%) and *** (1%) refers to the most common statistical significance levels 
 
 Patriotic only us +/-3 days Patriotic only us +/-5 days Patriotic only us +/-10 days Patriotic only us +/-20 days 
  Coef. Std. Err. T (p>T) Coef. Std. Err. T (p>T) Coef. Std. Err. T (p>T) Coef. Std. Err. T (p>T) 
                  
treateffect -0.00004 0.00068 -0.06 
(0.951) 
-0.00004 0.00049 -0.08 
(0.938) 
-0.000129 0.00050 -0.26 
(0.795) 
-0.00032 0.00043 -0.75 
(0.452) 
logs -0.00504 0.00114 -4.40 
(0.000***) 
-0.00498 0.00078 -6.32 
(0.000***) 
-0.004895 0.00059 -8.37 
(0.000***) 
-0.00618 0.00074 -8.32 
(0.000***) 
Firmfixed effect yes   yes   yes   yes   
Date fixed effect yes   yes   yes   yes   
R-squared 0.1114    0.1008   0.0976   0.0855    
Adj R-squared 0.0680 
 
  0.0709 
  
0.0786 
  
0.0722 
 
  
Number of obs 34 872 
 
  52 693 
  
84,125 
  
129 259 
 
  
 
